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FORECASTS  1982 
Roy  H.  Webb 
The  views  and  opinions  set  forth  in  this  section 
are  those  of  the various  forecasters.  No  agreement 
or  endorsement  by  this Bank  is implied. 
Forecasters  are  displaying  a  surprising  degree  of 
unanimity  on  the  economic  outlook  for  1982.  Based 
in  part  on  the  scheduled  reduction  of marginal  income 
tax  rates,  13  of  14  forecasters  surveyed  in  early 
January  anticipated  strong  growth  of  production  and 
trade  after  the  first  quarter  of  the  year.  Moreover, 
all  see  lower  inflation  rates  during  the  year.  Even  if 
such  relatively  optimistic  predictions  are  realized, 
however,  the  economy  would  only  partially  recover 
the  output  losses  of  recent  years. 
Tables  I  and  II  display  median  values  of  the  fore- 
casts  surveyed.  Highlights  from  the  tables  are  dis- 
cussed  below  as  they  relate  to  the  economy’s  recent 
performance,  the  accuracy  of  last  year’s  forecasts, 
Table  I 
RESULTS  FOR  1981  AND  TYPICAL  FORECASTS  FOR  1982 
Percentage  Change 
Gross  national  product  ......................................... 




Gross  private  domestic  investment  ............... 
Fixed  investment: 
Nonresidential  .......................... 
Residential  .............................. 
Change  in  business  inventories  ................ 
Net  exports  ............................. 
Government  purchases  ...................... 
Federal  ..................................... 
State  and  local  ......................................... 
Gross  national  product  (1972  dollars)  ............ 
Corporate  profits  after  taxes  .......................... 
Private  housing  starts .......................................... 
Domestic  automobile  sales  ..................................... 
Rate  of  unemployment  ........................................... 
Industrial  production  index  ..................................... 
Consumer  price  index  ............................................. 
Producer  price  index  (finished  goods)  .................. 







$  billions  2,922.2  3,150 
$  billions  1,858.l  2,027 
$  billions  232.0  251 
$  billions  743.4  795 
$  billions  882.7  982 
$  billions  450.6  469 
$  billions  327.1  351 
$  billions  105.3  109 
$  billions  18.2  8 
$  billions  23.8  15 
$  billions  589.6  639 
$  billions  228.6  255 
$  billions  361.1  384 
$  billions  1,509.6  1,514 
$  billions  129.8  129 
thousands  1,086.6  1,195 
thousands  6,163.l  6,644 
percent  7.6  8.4 
1967 = 100  150.9  151.8 
1967 = 100  272.4  294.2 
1967 =  100  269.7  287.0 

















10.5  7.3 
0.1  3.6 
10.3  8.4 
14.9  11.6 
7.5  6.3 
1.9  0.3 
-1.7  -0.9 
-  15.9  10.0 
-5.9  7.8 
2.7  0.6 
10.4  8.0 
9.8  6.4 
9.1  7.5 
l Data  available  as  of  January  1982. 
**  These  data  are  constructed  using  preliminary  1981  data  and  the  median  annual  percentage  change  forecast  for  each  category.  Since 
the  annual  percentage  change  is calculated  from  yearly  average  values,  it  will  not  equal  the  average  quarterly  change  that  could  be 
computed  from  Table  II. 
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TYPICAL  QUARTERLY  CHANGES  FORECAST  FOR  1982 
(Percentage  Changes  at  Annual  Rates Unless Otherwise  Noted) 
Gross  national  product  .......................................................... 
Personal  consumption  expenditures  ................................ 
Durables  ................................. 
Nondurables  ............................ 
Services  ......................................... 
Gross  private  domestic  investment  ................................... 
Fixed  investment: 
Nonresidential  .................................. 
Residential  ........................... 
Changes  in  business  inventories**  .............................. 
Government  purchases  .......................... 
Federal  ........................................ 
State  and  local  ........................ 
Net  exports*  *  ........................... 
Gross  national  product  (1972  dollars)  .............................. 
Corporate  profits  after  taxes  .............................................. 
Private  housing  starts  ............................ 
Domestic  automobile  sales  .............................. 
Rate  of  unemployment†  ........................................................ 
Industrial  production  index  ............................ 
Consumer  price  index  .......................... 
Producer  price  index  (finished  goods)  ................................. 
GNP  implicit  price  deflator  ..................................................... 
Forecast  1982* 
I  II  III  IV 
5.1  10.1  12.2  12.0 
9.7  8.3  10.5  12.0 
12.1  10.4  22.5  19.1 
6.2  7.3  8.2  9.1 
10.3  10.9  10.6  11.4 
-  11.7  12.1  23.4  19.5 
3.6  6.9  12.4  13.5 
-  1.3  38.8  43.9  36.2 
-  5.4  2.4  9.0  13.9 
6.7  6.1  8.3  10.9 
6.8  8.0  10.0  15.8 
7.6  6.0  5.3  7.2 
21.7  18.0  19.0  18.0 
-  1.0  2.7  4.9  4.8 
-2.3  18.3  29.5  22.3 
12.5  18.6  8.8  10.6 
9.1  7.4  7.6  3.1 
8.6  8.6  8.4  7.9 
-3.2  4.8  9.3  6.3 
6.4  7.3  7.8  8.0 
7.4  6.7  8.3  8.5 
7.0  7.1  6.8  7.4 
*  Median  quarterly  percentage  change  forecast  for  each  quarter  for  each  category. 
**  Quarterly  levels,  billions  of  dollars,  annual  rates. 
† Quarterly  levels,  percent. 
and  predicted  actions  by  government  agencies.  Some 
difficulties  of  using  economic  forecasts  are  then  dis- 
cussed  in  the  final  section. 
The  median  forecast  sees  a cyclical  recovery  begin- 
ning  in  1982.  Real  GNP  is  projected  to  grow  at  a 
4.1  percent  rate  in  the  last  three  quarters,  following  a 
1.0  percent  decline  in  the  first  quarter.  Tax  rate 
reductions  are  expected  to  boost  total  personal  con- 
sumption  expenditures  by  10.1  percent,  with  con- 
sumer  spending  for  durable  goods  expected  to  rise 
at  a  15.9  percent  rate  over  the  year.’  While  some 
1 Growth  rates  “over  the  year”  are  from  the  fourth 
quarter  of  the  preceding  year  to  the  fourth  quarter  of  the 
year  being  forecast.  They  will  thus  differ  from  changes 
in  the  yearly  average  values  presented  in  Table  I. 
recovery  is  forecast  for  residential  construction,  the 
predicted  28  percent  growth  for  1982  is  actually  quite 
modest  in  light  of  that  industry’s  depressed  condition 
in  late  1981.  Nonresidential  fixed  investment  is 
anticipated  to  grow  by  9  percent  over  the  year,  only 
slightly  ahead  of  inflation,  while  state  and  local  gov- 
ernment  spending  at  the  end  of  1982  is  projected  to 
be  only  6.5  percent  above  the  late  1981  level. 
The  anticipated  pattern  of  GNP  growth,  however, 
is  reminiscent  of  the  forecast  for  1981.  At  that  time, 
there  were  no  forecasts  (in  the  17  surveyed)  of 
even  a  0.5  percent  GNP  growth  rate  in  the  first 
quarter.  Indeed,  the  median  forecast  was  for  zero 
growth,  in  contrast  to  the  8.6  percent  rate  of  growth 
that  did  occur.  And  not  only  were  there  no  forecasts 
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median  forecast  was  for  3.6  percent  real  growth 
during  the  final  six  months.  Thus  while  the  median 
forecast  correctly  predicted  positive  real  growth  for 
the  year  as  a  whole,  both  the  small  magnitude  and  the 
quarterly  pattern  were  surprises  for  the  forecasters. 
Should  the  median  forecast  for  1982  be  realized, 
the  economy  in  many  respects  will  remain  well  below 
its  potential.  If  industrial  production,  for  example, 
were  to  grow  at  the  predicted  4.2  percent  rate,  it 
would  end  the  year  below  its  value  in  January  1979. 
And  housing  starts,  at  1.45  million  units  forecast, 
would  not  approach  the  2  million  unit  level  that  was 
last  attained  in  November  1978.  Also,  the  unem- 
ployment  rate  of  7.9  percent  projected  for  the  last 
quarter  of  1982  is  well  above  the  “natural  rate” 
(often  estimated  in  the  neighborhood  of  6  percent,  a 
figure  last  seen  in  December  1979).  More  examples 
could  be  provided,  but  the  main  point  should  be  clear  : 
after  three  years  of virtual  stagnation,  the  anticipated 
economic  growth  in  1982  is  but  a  small  step  toward 
full  recovery. 
Further  disinflation  is  predicted  for  1982.  The 
GNP  deflator  and  the  consumer  price  index  are  fore- 
cast  to  rise  by  7.1  percent  and  7.4  percent  during 
1982,  respectively,  compared  with  increases  of  8.6 
percent  and  8.9  percent  in  1981.  Both  rose  more 
slowly  than  anticipated  in  1981;  median  forecasts 
were  for  9.1  percent  growth  by  the  deflator  and  10.7 
percent  by  the  CPI.  Those  overestimates  were  con- 
sistent  with  the  tendency  of  forecasters  to  underpre- 
dict  changes  in  inflation  rates,  as  they  did  in  such 
recent  episodes  as  the  1973-74  acceleration  of  prices, 
the  1976  decline  of  inflation,  and  the  sustained  in- 
crease  in  inflation  from  1977  to  1980.  If  that  ten- 
dency  toward  underprediction  recurs,  inflation  should 
decline  more  than  the  forecast  1.5  percent. 
Several  factors  are  noted  by  forecasters  with  re- 
spect  to  the  inflation  outlook.  For  one,  the  Federal 
Reserve  allowed  monetary  growth  to  be  unexpectedly 
low  in  1981  (no  forecaster  in  the  survey  anticipated  a 
shift-adjusted  growth  rate  as  low  as  the  actual  2.1 
percent)  and  the  Fed  is  expected  to  keep  monetary 
growth  relatively  low  in  1982.  Some  forecasters  also 
mentioned  the  low  degree  of  resource  utilization, 
most  notably  high  unemployment  as  a  factor  moder- 
ating  wage  growth.  Favorable  trends  in  energy  and 
food  markets  are  also  foreseen.  However,  the  pro- 
jected  increase  in  aggregate  demand  in  the  last  half 
of  1982  is  reflected  in  an  inflation  forecast  for  the 
last  half  that  is  well  above  the  first  two  quarters. 
More  details  of  the  median  forecast  are  contained 
in  Tables  I  and  II.  In  addition,  this  Bank  publishes 
the  booklet  Business  Forecasts  1982,  which  is  a  com- 
pilation  of  business  forecasts  with  names  and  details 
of  the  various  estimates.  As  such,  it  contains  con- 
siderably  more  information  than  this  brief  summary. 
Readers  may  find,  however,  that  at  some  point  they 
receive  more  forecast  information  than  they  are  able 
to  readily  use.  It  may  not  be  easy  to  decide  what 
information  is  relevant  and  then  to  integrate  that 
information  with  other  knowledge  so  as  to  improve 
anticipations  of  future  economic  conditions.  A  per- 
spective  for  studying  forecasts  may  therefore  be  of 
help;  for  that  reason,  one  is  outlined  below. 
EVALUATING  ECONOMIC  FORECASTS 
When  confronted  with  economic  forecasts,  poten- 
tial  users  often  react  in  opposite  ways,  either  taking 
them  too  seriously  or  ignoring  them  altogether.  The 
view  taken  here  is  that  neither  extreme  is  tenable. 
For  while  it  is  true  that  it  is  virtually  impossible  to 
forecast  the  future  with  complete  accuracy,  it  is  also 
true  that  even  a  forecaster  whose  record  shows  obvi- 
ous  errors  may  still  provide  projections  containing 
useful  information.  That  said,  however,  it  should  be 
noted  that  the  task  of  extracting  useful  information 
from  forecasts  is  far  from  trivial.  These  issues  are 
explored  below. 
At  first  glance  it  is  easy  to  overvalue  forecasts. 
Since  they  are  normally  stated  as  point  estimates  and 
are  often  advocated  with  a  good  deal  of  authority,  a 
natural  inclination  is to  treat  these  numbers  as  having 
the  same  precision  as  others  that  are  often  encoun- 
tered.  A  little  experience,  however,  demonstrates 
that  forecasts  can  be  very  imprecise.  Table  III,  for 
example,  presents  median  forecasts  and  actual  out- 
comes  for  representative  variables  from  recent  edi- 
tions  of  this  Bank’s  annual  Business  Forecasts 
publication.  The  average  magnitude  of  the  forecast 
error  in  each  case  is  a  sizeable  fraction  of  the  vari- 
able  that  was  forecast. 
When  predictions  fail  to  approximate  actual  out- 
comes,  some  observers  proceed  to  summarily  reject 
all  forecasts.  As  The  Wall  Street  Journal  [5]  re- 
cently  put  it,  “[W]e  see  no  reason  to  defer  to  them 
[econometric  models]  on  anything  so  complicated  as 
an  economy.  .  .  .  [W]e  are  not  going  to  take  eco- 
nomic  predictions  about  the  day  after  tomorrow  as 
more  than  food  for  reflection.”  Similarly,  as  the 
chief  executive  of one  large  company  said  about  econ- 
omists’  predictions  [1],  “I  go  out  of  my  way  to 
ignore  them.” 
Although  the  temptation  to  ignore  forecasts  may 
be  strong,  it  is  another  matter  to  propose  a  better 
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MEDIAN  FORECASTS 
Real  GNP  (Percent  Change)  Inflation  Rote  (GNP  Deflator) 
Actual  Predicted  Error  Actual  Predicted  Error 
Treasury  Bill Rote 
Actual  Predicted  Error 
1971  .................... 
1972  ................. 
1973  ................. 
1974  ............... 
1975  ................... 
1976  .................. 
1977  ..................... 
1978  ................... 
1979  .................... 
1980  .................. 
1981  (preliminary)  ......... 
Average  Error  ................ 
Root-Mean-Square  Error 
4.7  3.8  1.0  4.7  3.6  1.1 
7.0  5.6  1.4  4.3  3.2  1.1 
4.3  6.0  1.7  7.0  3.3  3.7 
-2.7  1.2  3.9  10.1  5.5  4.6 
2.2  -0.6  2.8  7.7  7.1  0.6 
4.4  6.0  1.6  4.7  5.4  0.7 
5.8  5.0  0.8  6.1  5.7  0.4 
5.3  4.2  1.2  8.5  5.9  2.6 
1.7  1.5  0.2  8.1  7.1  1.0 
-0.3  -0.8  0.4  9.8  8.2  1.6 
0.7  2.4  1.7  8.6  9.1  0.5 
1.5  1.6 
1.8  2.1 
7.3  6.0  1.3 
5.7  7.1  1.4 
4.7  7.1  2.4 
6.1  5.8  0.4 
8.7  6.5  2.1 
11.8  8.1  3.7 
13.7  8.6  5.1 
11.8  10.8  1.0 
2.2 
2.6 
Predictions  are  from  Business Forecasts,  published  annually  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond.  The  error  is  the  absolute  value  of 
the  difference  between  predicted  and  actual  values  (although  calculations  use  several  decimal  places,  rounded  values  are  presented  in  the 
table).  The  root-mean-square  error  is  the  square  root  of  the  average  squared  error.  Real  growth  and  inflation  are  from  the  fourth 
quarter  of  the  previous  year  to  the  fourth  quarter  of  the  stated  year.  The  Treasury  bill  rate  is  the  average  value  in  the  fourth  quarter. 
strategy  for  making  decisions  in  an  uncertain  world. 
Individual  households,  firms,  and  government  bu- 
reaus  must  act  on  the  basis  of  their  anticipations  of 
future  quantities  to  be  exchanged  and  future  prices 
for  transactions  in  commodity,  labor,  and  financial 
markets.  Each  individual  decision-maker  could,  of 
course,  form  such  anticipations  in  a  haphazard,  un- 
systematic  manner.  But  many  individuals  have  found 
that  systematic  study  can  improve  the  quality  of  fore- 
casts.  In  forecasting,  as  in  most  productive  activities, 
there  are  potential  gains  from  specialization  and  ex- 
change.  That  a $100  million  forecasting  industry  has 
developed  and  prospered  should  therefore  not  be 
surprising,  past  errors  for  every  individual  forecaster 
notwithstanding. 
In  fact,  the  large  number  of  forecasters  and  the 
quantity  of  data  that  each  generates  can  make  it 
difficult  for  potential  consumers  of  forecasts  to  con- 
dense  the  information  flow  to  a  usable  volume  and 
then  employ  that  information  to  make  better  deci- 
sions.  An  obvious  strategy  is  to  identify  a  particular 
forecaster  that  has  been  especially  accurate  in  the  past 
and  hope  that  his  future  results  are  as  good.  This, 
however,  is  not  as  easy  as  it  sounds.  On  the  con- 
trary,  identifying  a  superior  forecaster  is  itself  a 
formidable  task. 
Difficulties  in  Identifying  a  Superior  Forecaster 
One  difficulty  is  that  users  will  seldom  agree  on  the 
exact  criteria  for  ranking  forecasters.  Different 
users,  of  course,  require  forecasts  of  different  vari- 
ables.  And  superiority  in  forecasting  one  variable 
does  not  necessarily  carry  over  to  other  variables. 
Even  users  interested  in  one  particular  variable  may 
find  different  error  measures  most  relevant  to  their 
own  needs.  For  example,  one  user  might  prefer  a 
low  average  error,  whereas  another  might  prefer  a 
low  probability  of  an  especially  large  error.  Still 
another  might  prefer  a  low  probability  of  “turning 
point”  errors.  (A  turning  point  is  the  time  at  which 
a  growing  variable  begins  to  decline  or  vice  versa.) 
Even  if  there  were  agreement  on  a  particular  error 
measure  for  a  particular  variable,  it  is  not  clear  that 
current  data  could  support  a  meaningful  ranking. 
One  problem  is  that  different  forecasters  have  ex- 
celled  at  different  times  in  the  past.  In  addition,  there 
is  little  agreement  on  what  constitutes  a  statistically 
significant  difference  in  forecasting  records  (that  is, 
what  can  be  judged  with  a  certain  degree  of  confi- 
dence  to  be  real  performance  differentials  rather  than 
mere  chance).  Stephen  McNees  [8,9]  has  studied 
in  depth  the  problem  of  identifying  superior  forecasts 
and  presents  valuable  data  for  the  interested  reader. 
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is  to  adopt  the  philosophy  that  the  primary  purpose 
of a forecast  is  to  reduce  the  user’s  uncertainty.  This 
approach  explicitly  recognizes  that  not  only  are  users 
never  completely  uninformed  about  past  trends,  but 
also  that  they  can  never  be  perfectly  certain  about 
future  events.  Accordingly,  the  first  step  in  em- 
ploying  this  approach  is  to  examine  a  user’s  initial 
knowledge  and  specify  his  initial  uncertainty.  The 
next  step  is  to  then  use  available  forecasts  to  reduce 
that  uncertainty.  Henri  Theil  [10]  has  examined 
both  problems  and  presents  a  discussion  of  these 
issues  with  several  specific,  detailed  examples. 
Taking  the  easier  problem  first,  a  user’s  existing 
knowledge  about  future  movements  of  one  particular 
variable  can  be  described  by  the  best  point  estimate 
he  could  make  together  with  an  estimate  of  that  fore- 
cast’s  precision.2  (“Precision”  is  defined  as  the  re- 
ciprocal  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the  ex  ante 
distribution  of  forecast  errors;  thus  that  definition 
and  the  informal  meaning  coincide,  in  the  sense  that 
the  greater  the  precision  of  a  forecast,  the  greater 
the  likelihood  that  the  realization  will  be  within  a 
given  distance  of  the  forecast.)  Thus  when  com- 
paring  forecasts,  the  one  that  could  best  lower  uncer- 
tainty  would  be  the  one  that  had  the  highest  probable 
precision  accompanying  the  point  estimate.  Equiva- 
lently,  a  forecast  could  be  presented  as  an  interval 
centered  on  a  point  estimate  together  with  a  state- 
ment  of  the  probability  of  the  realization  lying  out- 
side  that  interval.  Presented  this  way,  less  uncer- 
tainty  would  be  represented  as  a  narrower  predicted 
interval. 
Characterizing  Uncertainty  :  An  Illustration  As 
an  example  of  how  uncertainty  could  be  character- 
ized  in  a  particular  case,  suppose  that  before  con- 
sulting  a  forecaster,  a  user’s  best  estimate  of  inflation 
over  the  next  four  quarters  would  be  the  inflation 
rate  experienced  over  the  preceding  four  quarters 
for  which  data  are  available.  Using  the  root-mean- 
squared  (RMS)  error  (that  is,  the  square  root  of 
the  average  squared  error)  from  a  sample  of previous 
2 It  may  be  objected  that  many  people  do  not  have  the 
information  to  make  such  a  forecast.  However,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  have  much  information  in  order  to  make 
judgments  on  relative  likelihoods,  which  can  be  equiva- 
lent  to  a  subjective  probability  distribution  (see,  for 
example,  Morris  DeGroot  [3]).  Hence  it  is  likely  that  a 
cursory  inspection  of  newspapers  or  television  news 
would  permit  at  least  a  very  imprecise  forecast. 
Table  IV 
ESTIMATED  PRECISION  OF  SEVERAL 
FORECASTING  METHODS 
RMS  Error, 
Percent 
Precision 
Method  of  forecasting  inflation 
Extrapolation  of  past 
inflation  rate  2.7  0.37 
Median  forecast  2.1  0.47 
Lagged  money  growth  rate  1.3  0.74 
Method  of  forecasting 
real  GNP  growth 
Always  predicting 
trend  rate  (3.4%) 
Median  forecast 
2.8  0.35 
1.8  0.53 
Forecasts  are  for  percentage  increaser,  fourth  quarter  to  fourth 
quarter,  1971  to  1981. 
forecasts  as  an  estimate  of  the  standard  deviation  of 
the  current  forecast  error,3  the  precision  of  that 
method  is  shown  in  Table  IV. 
As  Table  IV  indicates,  simple  extrapolation  of 
past  inflation  provided  relatively  imprecise  forecasts. 
Table  IV  also  shows  that  one  could  have  done  better, 
since  the  median  forecast,’  (reported  in  Table  III) 
would  have  provided  forecasts  that  were  about  30 
percent  more  precise.  But  extrapolation  may  not  be 
the  best  technique  at  a  user’s  disposal  and  thus  may 
be  too  easy  a  comparison.  As  Robert  Hetzel  [6] 
has  noted,  inflation  can  be  easily  forecast  by  using 
3  It should  be  noted  that  the  RMS  error  of  a  small 
sample  of  forecasts  gives  a  fairly  crude  estimate  of  future 
precision.  In  order  to  make  rigorous  probability  state- 
ments  it  would  be  necessary  that  forecast  errors  be  inde- 
pendent,  identically  distributed  random  variables  with 
zero  mean.  These-stringent  assumptions  are  clearly  not 
fulfilled  by  existing  forecasts.  First,  one  presumes  that 
forecasters  learn  from  experience  and  improve  their 
models  over  time,  thus  contradicting  the  underlying  as- 
sumption  of  an  unchanging  distribution  of  forecast  errors. 
But  any  uncorrected  flaws  in  forecasting  procedures  can 
cause  forecast  errors  to  recur  over  time,  violating  an 
assumed  independence  of  successive  forecasts.  Also,  the 
assumed  zero  mean  may  also  be  questionable.  However, 
while  the  historical  RMS  error  cannot  be  used  to  gen- 
erate  rigorous  probability  statements  about  the  reliability 
of  current  forecasts  of  future  conditions,.  in  the  author’s 
view  it  does  provide  a  useful  starting  point,  especially  in 
the  absence  of  better  information  from  forecasters  them- 
selves  on  probable  future  precision. 
4 The  optimal  method  of  combining  information  from 
several  forecasters  is  an  interesting,  unresolved  puzzle. 
The  median  forecast  is  used  in  this  article  primarily  for 
its  simplicity. 
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estimating  inflation  over  an  interval  as  equal  to 
money  growth  two  years  earlier,  one  can  construct  a 
record  of  simulated  inflation  forecasts5  that  per- 
formed  relatively  well.  As  shown  in  Table  IV,  from 
1971  to  1981  the  simple  money  growth  prediction 
would  have  increased  forecast  precision  by  about  50 
percent  relative  to  the  median  forecast.6 
Another  example  is  shown  in  Table  IV.  If  a user’s 
best  estimate  of  real  GNP  growth  had  been  the  his- 
torical  trend  rate  of  growth,  then  the  median  fore- 
cast  would  have  raised  that  user’s  forecast  precision 
by  about  56  percent. 
These  examples  show  that  receipt  of  a  forecast  can 
considerably  lower  uncertainty  relative  to  an  alter- 
native  such  as  extrapolation  or  use  of  the  historical 
trend.  But  individuals  may  employ  other  methods 
that  have  such  a  degree  of  prospective  accuracy 
that  a  typical  forecast  would  not  reduce  uncertainty. 
Thus  the  examples  illustrate  the  importance  of 
careful  examination  of  existing  information  before 
attempting  to  determine  the  value  of  economic  fore- 
casts.7 
Providing  Estimates  of  Forecast  Precision  Al- 
though  forecast  precision  was  estimated  in  Table  IV 
by  looking  only  at  recent  forecasts  and  the  actual 
outcomes,  other  information  could  also  be  useful.  To 
illustrate,  note  that  the  economic  environment  can 
change.  so  as  to  alter  the  predictability  of  economic 
events.  Forecasters  of  interest  rates,  for  example, 
have  found  their  task  more  difficult  since  the  October 
1979  change  in  Federal  Reserve  operating  proced- 
5 Since  this  technique  was  proposed  partly  on  the  basis 
of  its  performance  over  a  segment  of  the  sample  period, 
it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  true  ex  ante  forecast. 
6 Due  to  a  suspicion  that  taking  the  median  of  a  chang- 
ing,  unscientifically  selected  collection  of  forecasts  might 
itself  lead  to  poor  results,  the  record  of  a  single  major 
forecaster  was  also  examined.  That  suspicion  was  not 
confirmed  as  that  forecaster  made  slightly  less  precise 
inflation  forecasts  than  the  median  forecast  presented. 
7 This  article  has  viewed  forecasts  as  unconditional  state- 
ments  regarding  future  conditions.  However,  some  fore- 
casts  are  presented  as  statements  of  the  future  provided 
that  a specific  condition  is  fulfilled.  An  example  of  such  a 
conditional  forecast  would  be  a  projected  inflation  rate 
between  5  and  7  percent  if  M1  grew  between  3  and  5 
percent.  While  a  reliable  conditional  forecast  could  be 
especially  useful  for  some  decision-makers,  the  reliability 
of  existing  conditional  forecasts  has  not  been  proven. 
Perhaps  the  most  obvious  use  of  conditional  forecasts  is 
in  formulating  national  economic  policy.  It  turns  out, 
however,  that  such  forecasts  have  often  proved  highly 
misleading.  Robert  Lucas  [7]  has  explained  why  con- 
ventional  methods  cannot  provide  reliable  conditional 
forecasts  for  government  policymakers. 
ures.  Thus  a  statement  on  the  anticipated  precision 
of  interest  rate  forecasts  might  well  give  more  weight 
to  post-October  1979  data  than  would  a  mechanical 
calculation  of  RMS  errors  over  a  longer  time-span. 
Individual  forecasters,  with  detailed  knowledge  of 
the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  their  own  methods, 
would  arguably  be  in  the  best  position  to  make  such 
subjectively  adjusted  estimates  of  future  precision. 
Therefore  it  is  possible  to  imagine  forecasters  pro- 
viding  both  point  estimates  and  estimates  of  the 
precision  of  their  forecasts. 
If  forecasters  were  to  estimate  both  future  values 
and  their  forecasts’  precision,  then  forecasts  would 
for  the  first  time  be  verifiable.  Point  estimates  by 
themselves  are  not  verifiable  since  practically  every 
forecast  is  wrong  (that  is,  the  realized  value  is  not 
equal  to  the  forecast  value).  But  since  an  estimate  of 
precision  would  also  imply  a  confidence  interval  at- 
tached  to  a  forecast,8  evaluating  a  forecaster’s  record 
would  be  straightforward.  For  example,  if  50 percent 
of  actual  values  fell  outside  a  particular  forecaster’s 
published  95  percent  confidence  intervals  over  a  rea- 
sonably  long  time,  further  forecasts  would  be  highly 
suspect. 
If  estimates  of  precision  would  indeed  be  useful, 
why  do  not  forecasters  generally  provide  such  esti- 
mates?9  There  are  at  least  two  relevant  consider- 
ations.  First,  while  proper  verification  of  a  forecast- 
er’s  product  would  require  a  reasonably  long  sample 
period,  consumers  might  choose  among  forecasting 
services  on  the  basis  of  a  fairly  small  number  of 
forecasts.  Thus  a  good  forecaster  could  lose  cus- 
tomers  if his  forecasts  were  off-target  simply  due  to  a 
run  of  bad  luck.  Secondly,  it  was  noted  above  that  a 
comparison  of  past  forecasts  with  realized  values  is 
only  a  starting  point  for  assessing  the  probable  accu- 
racy  of  current  forecasts.  A  more  complete  method 
for  estimating  a  forecast’s  probable  precision  has  been 
used  by  Ray  Fair  [4].  The  price  of  additional  com- 
pleteness  is  a  set  of  more  complex  procedures  which, 
although  feasible,  would  certainly  increase  the  cost 
of  providing  forecasts.  Consequently,  reasonable 
8 Assuming  that  ex  ante  forecast  errors  are  unbiased  and 
identically  normally  distributed,  there  would  be  a  95 
percent  probability  that  the  difference  between  realized 
and  actual  values  would  be  no  larger  than  1.96 times  the 
reciprocal  of  a  forecast’s  true  precision. 
9 Some  forecasters  do  provide  a  limited  amount  of  infor- 
mation  relating  to  precision.  Such  estimates  are  typically 
for  a  small  number  of  variables,  few  time  periods,  and  are 
not  prominently  displayed.  The  large  majority  of  fore- 
casters,  however,  do  not  make  even  such  a  limited  effort. 
22  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JANUARY/FEBRUARY  1982 estimates  of the  demand  for  routine  but  careful  analy- 
sis  of  forecast  precision  may  well  indicate  that  intro- 
duction  of  such  a  costly  and  risky  product  is  not 
currently  justified. 
scope  of  this  article,  an  example  was  given  that 
Conclusion  The  foregoing  discussion  provides  an 
approach  to  using  economic  forecasts  that  evaluates  a 
forecast  by  the  extent  to  which  it  can  reduce  users’ 
uncertainty  about future  economic  conditions.  While 
a  thorough  examination  of  the  subject  is  beyond  the 
illustrates  how  estimates  of  a  forecast’s  value  will 
critically  depend  upon  the  knowledge  held  by  a  user 
for 
prior  to  receipt  of  a  forecast.  In  addition,  the  impor- 
their  own  purposes. 
tance  of a forecast’s  prospective  precision  was  empha- 
sized.  Besides  its  value  in  reducing  an  individual 
forecast  consumer’s  uncertainty,  such  an  estimate  of 
precision  would  make  forecasts  verifiable.  Although 
final  judgment  on  the  value  of  forecasts  is  not  at- 
tempted  in  this  paper,  it  is  hoped  that  some  readers 
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